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CHAPTER I 
Introduction and Review of the Literature 
The present research constitutes an attempt to investigate social. intel-
ligence from a developmental point of view. Social intelligence or behavioral 
cognition, according to the structure of intellect (SI) model (Guilford, 1956, 
1957, 1959, 1967; O'Sullivan & Guilford, 1966; O'Sullivan, Guilford, & de Mille, 
i965) is studied within a developmental context which, according to several 
investigators, has been heretofore largely neglected (Bessell and Palomares, 
1967; Burns and Cavey, 1957; Flavell, 1963; Guilford, 1967). 
When one broadly defines social intelligence as "the ability to understand 
people," it is apparent that this general construct has enjoyed a long and 
colorful history in folklore and common sense experience as well as in scien-
tific psychology. People have long spoken of "woman's intuition" to indicate 
a widely held belief that females are somehow especially gifted in understand-
ing and judging others (Westcott, 1968). We have all heard or have ourselves 
described certain people with such phrases as "She is a good judge of character,' 
or "He has a good 'feel' for people." 
There exists a vast literature on investigations which have in some way 
!been concerned with social intelligence. Such studies have fallen under num-
erous different rubrics, and have been reviewed as "the perception of persons" 
(Bruner & Taiguri, 1954), as "the ability to judge people" (Taft, 1955), as 
"skill in social perception" (Bronfenbrenner, Harding, & Gallwey, 1958), as 
intuition in the judgment of complex interpersonal situations" (~estcott, 1968), 
as "empathy" (Dymond, 1950; Rogers, 1962), and as "social intelligence" 
(Guilford, 1965). 
Facility in "being able to see things from the other person's point of 
p .. 
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view •.• which seems to assure more effective communication and understanding 
[p. 344]" has been widely investigated as "empathy", with special reference to 
professional clinicians (Dymond, 1950). Suran (1970) concludes that the social 
intelligence concept is a meaningful one in terms of which to consider the 
personality of the T-group trainer. 
Psychologists have generally used the term social intelligence, Guilford 
(1965) asserts, to indicate an ability to judge people, behavioral understand-
ing, or behavioral cognition. O'Sullivan, Guilford, and de Mille (1965) note 
that their six hypothesized behavioral ·cognition abilities "probably collec-
tively cover the traditional constructs of social sensitivity, empathy, person 
perception, and perhaps even woman's intuition (p. l)." 
The present research on social intelligence primarily utilizes Guilford's 
(1965) concept of behavioral cognition: "The ability to understand the 
thoughts, feelings, and intentions of othe:ic peopl:~ as manifested in discernible i 
expressional cues (p. 6)." This definition has been derived from the structure 
of intellect (SI) model whose three dimensions specify the content, the oper-
ation, and the product of a given intellectual act. 
Further and more complete discussion of the SI model and the six factor 
tests of social intelligence (O'Sullivan et al., 1965) should be preceded by a 
review of other studies of social intelligence to which brief allusion has 
~een made. While it is not intended to be wholly comprehensive, such an over-
view of person perception, empathy, and interpersonal judgment research will 
serve to indicate both the vastness of the terrain and the relationship of 
Guilford's work to that of others. Individual studies will be cited largely as 
illustrative of recurring theoretical and methodological issues. The numerous 
p 
• 
~nd varied traditions of social intelligence research will be compared and 
contrasted with regard to their basic approaches, their respective shortcomings 
~nd advantages, and the relative sophistication and complexity of their design 
and conceptual schemata. 
p 
·Various Traditions ~f Social Intelligence Research 
Much of the research in social intelligence has been characterized by a 
perennial controversy over the experimental versus the individual differences 
approach. In the experimental camp are most of those whose research has been 
concerned with "the ability to judge people" (Cline and Richards, 1960; 
Gage, 1952; Norman, 1953; Taft, 1950; Wolf and Murray, 1937). These investi-
gators have labelled the phenomena they studied "person perception" rather 
than "social intelligence." Procedures used in other perceptual studies were 
thus employed in studying "social perception." Group tendencies were observed, 
and similarities rather than differences were the principle concern. In 
~inority opposition to this experimental tradition, have been those few inves-
tigators who have attempted to develop constructs and measures of social intel-
ligence using the individual differences approach. These researchers, 
(Guilford, 1967; Moss, 1927; O'Sullivan et al., 1965; E.L. Thorndike, 1920; 
R.L. Thorndike, 1936; Wedeck, 1947; Woodrow, 1939), almost without exception, 
can be characterized by their use of factor analytic techniques and by their 
conviction that assessment of individual differences in the ability to judge 
people should be conducted in the same way that individual differences in 
other kinds of aptitudes have been measured. 
In what has been cited by Westcott (1968) as "perhaps the earliest effort 
to bring 'intuition' into the laboratory," Valentine (1929) explored the folk 
psychology hypothesis that women were better than men in making judgments of 
others. In laying down his guiding definition, Valentine wrote,·"I shall use 
'intuition' as implying judgments (of character) of which the grounds are 
unconscious without limiting them to either innate or experiential bases" 
p 
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' (l929, p. 215). He sought intuitive judgments of character after allowing 
adult nonprofessional judges to interview children briefly. These judgments 
~ere then compared with criterion judgments made by the children's teachers. 
Both male and female subjects were interviewed by both male and female judges. 
since there were no differences in accuracy associated with the judges's sex, · 
the major hypothesis was not supported. But there were differences in success 
associated with the sex of the subject. Teachers' judgments and "intuitive" 
judgments had a significantly higher correlation with each other for girls 
than they did for boys. Oddly enough, the judges themselves had reported that 
the boys were easier to judge than were the girls. Thus, the least accurate 
judgments were also the most confident judgments. One might add that, in light 
of his major hypothesis, a rather remarkable omission was Valentine's failure 
to mention the sex of the teachers whose ratings were used as the original 
criterion measures. 
Adams (1927) studying "the good judge of personality," formed a number 
of equal sized groups whose members regularly met and ranked themselves and 
each other on a variety of traits. In a somewhat questionable technique, he 
took the overall mean of the repeated rankings by others as the "true position" 
for each group member on each characteristic, some of which, for example, 
"intelligence" and "popularity," were heavily laden with value connotations. 
Using these criteria, Adams appraised the accuracy of each individual in rating 
both himself and others. There were some subjects who consistently over or 
underrated themselves and others as well as some subjects who were consistently 
very accurate judges of self and others. Individual differences in performance 
and in associated personality characteristics were reported. Those subjects 
6. 
' ~ho were good judges of themselves were described by fellow group members as 
very interested in others, popular, polite, agreeable, sympathetic, tactful, 
demonstrative, and liking to be with others. In contrast, those subjects who 
were good judges of others tended to be described by the group as independent, 
aloof, gregarious rather than social, and only slightly interested in others. 
Adams resolved this paradox by hypothesizing that the good judge of self views 
society as an end in itself and sees himself as a means to the maintenance of 
society. His knowledge of his own characteristics are thus utilized as a 
~eans to maintain society while the good judge of others, seeing himself as 
the primary end, uses his knowledge of the characteristics of others for this 
pursuit. As one might expect from pioneer study in the area of interpersonal 
judgments, Adams' work suffers from a number of logical and procedural defi-
ciencies. Apart from his extrapolating beyond the data to explain the con-
trasting group descriptions of good "self" judges and good "other" judget., is 
Adams' use of averaged group judgments as a criterion measure. In fact, he 
used this measure for both the criterion of accuracy and for the description of 
the good judges. 
Vernon (1933), concerned with "intuitiveness" in the informal judgment of 
personality characteristics, pointed out that for a decade studies of the 
judgment of intelligence, emotion, or personality characteristics from photo-
graphs had yielded only negative results. He felt that two factors were re-
sponsible for such negative results: (1) simple photographs gave judges very 
little to work with, and (2) the separate judges' success scores.were generally 
. . 
averaged, thus obviating important individual differences. After having found 
in one of his own experiments that correlations between judgments and criteria 
p 
' had ranged from -0.88 to 0.83 for different judges, he raised the question as 
to the consistency of individual differences in success. While he employed 
the same kinds of judges as Adams, Vernon used somewhat more objective cri-
terion measures. His 48 college student judges were each tested on 44 differ-
ent measures. Tests of intelligence, social intelligence, esthetic values, 
artistic judgment, Rorschach ~ubscores, and so on, constituted 24 of these 
~easures. Subjects' success scores in judging themselves, known others, and 
unknown others made up the other 20 measures. Success was appraised against 
the criteria of the 24 objective test scores. Many of the tests in the first 
group were found to be intercorrelated, but with regard to the tests of ability 
to judge others, Vernon (1933) concluded, "There is absolutely no meaningful 
or consistent relationship between these twenty tests, no general factor of 
'intuitiveness' (p. 51)." When the separate tests of intelligence, artistic 
judgment, etc., werr correlated with the scores on success of judgment, good 
judges of self were characterized as having a superior abstract intelligence, 
insight, and a sense of humor. Artistic skill was not a distinguishing 
characteristic. Good judges of friends were, in contrast, less distinctive, 
and were rated as less sociable, 'more artistic, and more introverted than 
good self judges. Good judges of strangers were rated as very superior in 
artistic tendencies and intelligence. No tendency for one kind of success to 
~e related to another kind of success was observed, and no general trait was 
discerned. Each relationship in which judging took place was seen as unique, 
Vernon felt, and success in one was not predictive of success in.another. A 
particular judge might judge certain kinds of people well or particular traits 
well, and the specifics were, he noted, as yet unclear. Vernon felt that a 
P' 
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' judge might be able to appraise the intelligence of a given subject well, and 
fail on judging his sociableness, while another might be successful on both of 
these with one subject, and fail on both with another subject. In summary, 
though, Vernon found some support for individual differences in interpersonal 
judgments, he did not seem convinced by Adams' original report or his own 
support of these findings. Voicing a complaint which was to be repeated 
twenty-five years later by Bronfenbrenner at al., Vernon stated: 
In other words, this whole field of social relations is to complex 
either to be summed up in a few stereotyped names such as insight, 
intuition, social intelligence, social perception, etc., or to be 
covered by the narrow categories of psychometric tests. (Vernon, 
1933, p. 55). 
Hathaway (1955) studied social perception or the judgment of personality 
in a relatively uncomplicated situation. He had subjects (called targets) 
stand at a leC;tern i.1 full view of a group of judges, and check one i tern in 
each of a series of groups of three items listed on a sheet of paper. The 
judges were to check, on an identical sheet, the items which they thought the 
~arget subject was checking. The procedure was as simple as that. As defined 
"by Hathaway, clinical intuit.ion was: 
••• the inferential process producing clinical inferences made 
by a percipient or receiver person relative to a target person in 
which the inferences have their source in cues or cognitive 
processes that the percipient is unable to identify or specify 
with satisfactory completness ••• Intuition is involved either when 
the inferences drawn by the recipient or when the integrative 
powers of the recipient seem to exceed ordinary rational analysis 
(1955, p. 233). 
In addition to this definition of clinical intuition, he went on to describe 
three other kinds of clinical inference. He identified the following: 
,.. 
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(l) inference based on item by item observation with the aid of a set concern-
,. 
ing what to look for; (2) inference based on broader classificatory schemes 
and more diffuse observation; and (3) inference based on positive or negative 
~rejections. In the experiment itself, the three-word groups, from each of 
~hich the target subjects were to select one word, were made of very disparate 
items. One set was "butterfly, shotgun, baked custard;" another was "sheer 
negligee, umbrella, human lungs" (p. 236). While the target subject checked 
one of each group and the judges attempted to check the same words, the judges 
also rated the degree of confidence they had in their predictions and the 
degree of sympathy they felt for the particular subject being judged. 
Hathaway found that the ease of judging (assessed in terms of the degree of 
conformance between the target's choices and the judge's choices) was related 
to the particular pattern of choices made by the target. That is, some pattern~ 
of choice were easier to match than others, and fl.males were, in general, 
easier to judge than males. He also found that judges differed in their 
accuracy, and these differences were moderately consistent. 
However, when a comparison was made between the choice of judges in 
respect to particular targets and the actual performance of subjects who were 
not targets, it was found that the judges more closely approximated the non-
targets than they did their actual targets. Sympathy toward the particular 
target was moderately related to confidence in the judgments, but neither was 
related to accuracy 
It appears that the "successes" which were observed were actually ac-
cidental matches based on some kind of very general classification scheme, 
such as male-female, and had little to do with any unique qualities of the 
p 
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articular target being judged. Hathaway concluded, "The experimental data 
resented does not indicate the presence of a useful predictive ability" (p.248 • 
.. 
Valentine's and Hathaway's studies had their origins in the common, well-
known observations which may. or may not be accur.ate: at least some people 
are able to judge character and personality features of other individuals with 
tbe aid of very limited and informal cues. Further, it is commonly thought 
tbat some groups of people, for example women or clinicians, are better able 
to do this than are other groups of people, for example, men or non-clinicians. 
The common and well-established observation received no support from either of 
be experiments, at least at the level of group analysis. It appeared that 
success attained by anyone was almost purely accidental, although there 
as no follow-up of the particularly successful judges, who were not very 
successful, even at that. 
Hathaway did allude to these individual differences, and even to a ten-
dency for these to be stable, but he did not elaborate on them. This ommission 
is surprising, in the light of the common belief that some people are more 
successful than others at this kind of activity, and because individual differ-
ences had been noted by Adams and Vernon. 
Hebb's study (1946) of recognition by humans of emotional states in lower 
animals was more clinical than Hathaway's study of clinical intuition. This 
is true in that it focussed on a detailed analysis of the process of recogniz-
ing emotion both from the point of view of the behavior witnessed and of the 
inferential processes utilized. It was based on an observation as common as 
those which motivated the studies of intuition already reported: persons 
experienced in dealing with animals, particularly higher primates, commonly 
'~ .... ,,..,.. _____________________________________ ... 
p: 
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attribute emotional states to their charges, and these states are named as they 
are named in humans. Furthermore, the observers typically act in accord with 
them either by altering them or by maximizing their own safety. Finally, these 
intuitive appraisals are apparently accurate. In calling these judgments 
"intuitive," Hebb said, "Intuitive is used to refer to judgments which follow 
premises or steps of which the judge is unaware, and especially those he 
cannot put into words 11 (p. 89). 
Hebb's observations and study were carried out at the Yerkes Primate 
Laboratory and various kinds of data were used. Of great importance were the 
very detailed diary records kept on each animal from the time of its delivery 
to the laboratory. other materials comprised detailed descriptions of indi-
vidual chimpanzee behavior made by four members of the scientific and care-
taking staff, and detailed records of behavior at the time a member of the 
staff was interpreting behavior in terms of emotional states. Hebb was able 
to analyze the elements which gave rise to the attribution of emotional or 
attitudinal states to the chimpanzees, and although he felt it was not neces-
sary to assume that they exist in chimpanzees in the form they exist in man 
(or even to assume that they exist at all, in either man or beast), the at-
tribution of an emotional or attitudinal state provided a coherence and pre-
dictability to the behavior which was not otherwise possible. 
Two animals are described with respect to the three kinds of data: long-
term records, immediate emotional description, and detailed behavioral records 
at the time of the intuitive judgment of an emotional state. Both of the 
chimpanzees described were sometimes aggressive, and the aggressiveness was 
attributed to different emotional states: immediate malice in one and well-
established hate of man in the other. The observers who attributed these 
.. 
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different emotional states said that they were able to distinguish between the 
immediate behaviors exhibited although they could not specify just how they 
distinguished between them. On the contrary, the detailed behavioral des-
criptions of the two animals' behavior made by others at the time of attributio1 
of different emotional states could not be distinguished. That is, the ex-
perienced observers thought there were differences between the overt behaviors 
of the two animals which were associated with these two different emotional 
states, but no such differences in overt behavior could be documented. 
Through his analysis, Hebb found that the real differences in the chim-
panzees--for real differences did exist--lay not in their immediate attack be-
haviors at all, but in their other behaviors, behaviors extending over a period 
of years. Hebb calls the judgment of differences in the emotional states 
"intuitive," because he found it based on a complex set of cues of which the 
judges were unaware. 
In different cases, he found that important cues arose from (1) the 
stimulus situation, (2) the chimp's previous experience with such stimuli, 
(3) the response itself, (4) various aspects of the chimp's other behavior, 
and (5) behavior characteristics of the species. The most consistently 
important were (3) and (4), although the judges seemed to think (1) and (3) 
were the determining cues. Hebb concluded that the emotional behavior is notab e 
primarily as a deviation from some individual baseline, and it is upon this 
deviation that the "intuitive" judgment must rest, rather than upon the details 
of the act itself (p.79). 
Hebb pointed out that experiments on the judging of emotions in humans 
had, until that time, been singularly unsuccessful. Like Vernon (1933), he saw 
1.3. 
good reasons for failure, in that few, if any, of the appropriate cues for 
such judgments had been provided in the experiments. The usual materials were 
short sequences of action, pictures, and so on. If we assume--as most 
psychologists do--that judgments of other humans, whether "intuitive" or not, 
~equire some kinds of information, we should not be surprised at the lack of 
effects in the studies by Valentine and Hathaway, and the modest effects report-
ed by Adams and Vernon. 
On the other hand, we might well be surprised at some of the very modest 
results of studies of clinical judgments in which a great many cues are 
presumbably available. For example, in a study by Dymond ( 195 3) , psychothera-
pists predicted self-ratings of their own clients at the termination of psycho-
~herapy. The couselor's Q-sort for the client and the client's Q-sort for 
himself correlated between 0.05 and 0.84, with a mean of only o.41. In addi-
tion only half of the counselors did better on the Q-sort knowing who th~ 
subject was than they did knowing only that it was a "patient at the end of 
psychotherapy." Among the most accurately judged patients, there was a 
considerable number who were very like the model "patient at the end of 
psychotherapy," and a considerable number who were very different from the 
model. Moderately deviant patients were not so accurately judged. Conceivably, 
the counselors acted on the basis of their stereotypes of "patients at the end 
of therapy" unless the particular patient being judged was very different 
from this. The judgments may have been relatively gross, that is, there may 
have been few gradations between the stereotype and the very unique. An 
alternative interpretation, of course, is that some counselors were more 
successful than others simply because they were more skilled. Neither inter-
p 
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pretation is more than conjecture, buy Dymond concluded that clinicians could 
judge people. On the other hand, it seems that it is a pretty poor showing 
for individuals presumably trained in this activity, and who have had rela-
tively long and intimate contact with the subjects to be judged. 
Similarly, Luft (1950) found no difference between clinicians (psychia-
trists, psychologists, and social workers) and nonclinicians (physical scien-
tists) in predicting the behavior of persons on the instrument utilized, the 
Guilford STDCR,after hearing a case conference presentation or after hearing 
a recorded one-hour diagnostic interview. Cline, on the other hand, (1955), 
found professionals to be superior to nonprofessionals in a more elaborate 
design. Further exploring the positive and negative evidence on the power 
of informal combinatorial activity in judging other persons, Oskamp (1962) 
had undergraduates, VA clinical psychology trainees, and VA clinical staff 
~embers sort MMPI profiles into medical patient versus psychiatric patient 
categories. There were one hundred of each kind in the sample to be sorted. 
He found that all groups did better than chance, and the differences were 
very small. He found, on the other hand, that accuracy was positively related 
to experience, but on the other, confidence was negatively, but not significant· 
ly, related to experience. Appropriateness, that is, the agreement between 
accuracy and confidence, was higher for the more experienced. He also found 
that two different short-term training programs, one emphasizing accuracy and 
the other emphasizing appropriateness, brought the success scores of the less 
experienced well in line with the success scores of the most experienced. He 
concluded that whatever skills are ~cquired informally over years of experience 
can be equaled by a very short period of training in specific combinatorial 
activity. 
15. 
Considering the studies treated above, there seems to be little to 
support the notion that there is some specialized or generalized skill in 
judging other persons. Individual differences in success have turned out to 
be either unique to judging special qualities or unique to judging certain 
persons, individual differences have not been followed up, averaging techniques 
have confounded success measures, both clinicians and patients have been varied 
at the same time, samples have been small in the most detailed studies, judg-
ment categories have been either trivial or gross; and the situation has 
become more and more complex the closer we look at it. Perhaps an example of 
the kind of complexity of analysis which has grown up in the area of social 
perception--an event which is certainly based on implicit and obscure cues, 
many of which the judge is unable to report--can serve to give an idea of the 
futility of a single rubric of "social intelligence" for describing some kind 
of success in this area. 
Bronfenbrenner et al. (1958) provide a detailed summary of the kinds of 
categories they find necessary for the classification of skill in social per-
ception. They distinguish among the following theoretical categories: 
1. Social Sensitivity: the ability to recognize through direct 
observation the behavior or psychological states of another person\'~< 
or group. 
2. Predictive Skill: the ability to forecast actions or psycho-
logical states that are not being directly observed; that is, that 
occur at some time other than the one about which the observer has 
information. 
3. Role-taking: the ability to act or feel in the manner of 
another person (imitation) or to act or feel in accordance with the 
expectations of the other person (responsiveness). The form.er skill·/ 
is exemplified by the professional actor or by the undercover agent -
who must impersonate someone quite different from himself. The 
second ability, responsiveness, includes such skills as "saying the 
right thing," avoiding faux pas, acting as another person thinks 
appropriate, etc. (p. 97). 
16. 
These distinguishable skills are seen as interdependent, but by no means 
identical. Similarly, the specific variables investigated in their experiments 
a.re distinguished as follows: 
••• interpersonal sensitivity, defined as the ability to recog-
nize the ways in which other people differ in their behavior, per-
ceptions or feelings; and sensitivity to the generalized other, 
defined as the ability to recognize the typical response of 
persons in one's own subculture (p. 105) 
Some of Bronfenbrenner et al.'s empirical data required subjects to dis-
~inguish between sensitivity to one's own sex, and sensitivity to the opposite 
sex, both in terms of interpersonal sensitivity and in terms of sensitivity to 
the generalized other. There were no significant differences in sensitivity 
associated with the sex of the judge or the sex of the person being judged, 
but the behavioral correlates of individual differences in skill in social 
perception yielded many distinctions, and overall measures of sensitivity were 
greatly influenced by the particular structure of the group in wh:ichjudgments 
were made. The following extract from their summary gives the flavor of these 
distinctions: 
a. Men sensitive to their own sex were described by both 
men and women as resourceful, dominant, outgoing, but at the same 
time as somewhat dogmatic and annoying.· Men sensitive to women, 
however, were distinguished for their tact, tolerance, and timidity. 
Men sensitive to persons of either sex represented a compromise 
between the two preceding types and showed relatively few outstand-
ing characteristics. They were most frequently referred to as 
tactful, inoffensive, warm and resourceful. 
b. Women sensitive to their own sex were p~rceived as 
submissive, insecure, inhibited and ineffectual. In partial con-
trast, women sensitive to men, while still somewhat retiring, 
were seen as maintaining smooth interpersonal relationships. 
Women perceptive toward either sex were described as withdrawn but, 
at the same time, as considerate and accepting. 
c. Qualities associated with general interpersonal per-
ceptiveness in both sexes suggested a person who is sensitive in 
both senses of the term. It is possible that the person who is 
highly perceptive of other's feelings may pay a price in terms of 
realizing his own capacities for creative expression and forth-
right social behavior. This possibility calls into question the 
prevailing view that the "empathic" person is one who is effective 
in virtually all types of interpersonal situations, including a 
leadership role. 
d. The preceding findings are interpreted as reflecting 
differing stages and types of sex-role identification. These 
considerations, in turn, point to the conclusion that the nature 
of interpersonal sensitivity and its behavioral correlates is 
likely to vary with the developmental level of the person and to 
depend on the particular needs that may be activated in a given 
social context (pp. l05-lo6). 
Some more recent efforts in this area continue to approach the problem 
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of the generality of the skill of social perception (Cline and Richard, 1960, 
1961). As the analysis and conceptualization have become increasingly 
sophisticated and complex, the traditionally gl<bal or simplistic notions 
of social intelligence or intuitive judging appear more and more anachronistic 
and useless. 
.. 
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The structure of Intellect Model and Social Intelligence 
As noted earlier, the present study primarily employed Guilford's (1967) 
definition of "social intelligence" as"behavioral cognition." We now turn to 
a more complete discussion ·of Guilford's predecessors in the factor analytic 
tradition, the structure of intellect (SI) model, and the six tests of social 
intelligence. E. L. Thorndike (1920) was among the first to propose that there 
was a social intelligence which was distinct from the traditional kind of in-
telligence, or the ability to perform academic work. He defined social intelli 
gence as " ••• the ability to understand and manage men and women ••• to act wisely 
in human relations." Early work in the factor analysis of social intelligence 
was conducted by Robert L. Thorndike (1936), Woodrow (1939), and Wedeck (1947). 
Wedeck (1947), who introduced into his analysis eight new behavioral tests of 
his own, is credited by Guilford (1967) as being the· first analyst to report a 
behavioral factor. Guilford (1967) also cites a more recent factor analyst, 
El-Abd (1963), as having found something that might be called cognition of 
behavioral units for a sample of males but not for a sample of females. 
According to Guilford (1965), "common sense suggests that people vary in 
their ability to understand other people, and that aptitude of this kind is 
different from general intellectual ability." It is apparent that conceptions 
of social intelligence as offered by E. L. Thorndike and Guilford have much in 
common with the phenomena variously labelled "empathy,"'intuition," "social 
sensitivity," "person perception," and "interpersonal skill." By social 
intelligence, Guilford means " ••• the ability to understand and _judge people," 
or "behavioral understanding," or "behavioral cognition." Behavioral cognition 
and social intelligence will be used synonymously in the present discussion. 
19. 
Behavioral cognition is formally defined by Guilford (1967) as the "ability to 
understand the thoughts, feelings, and intentions of other people as 
manifested in discernible, expressional cues," (p. 6). This definition has 
been derived from the structure of intellect (SI) model whose three dimensions 
specify the content, the operation, and the product of a given intellectual 
act. SI theory hypothesizes: (1) four kinds of intellectual content--
semantic, symbolic, figural, and behavioral; (2) five different intellectual 
operations--cognition, memory, divergent production, convergent production, 
and evaluation; and (3) six product categories--units, classes, relations, 
systems, transformations, and implications. Within the behavioral-content 
area, the SI model predicts, by analogy to factors reportedly already 
demonstrated in other content areas, the existence of thirty different social 
or behavioral intelligence factors (six products for each of the five opera-
tions). In other words, the SI model predicts thirty different ways of being 
socially intell~~ent. Feeling that the demonstration of thirty new factors at 
one time was not feasible, Guilford (1967) noted that he purposely limited 
himself to an investigation of the cognitive or comprehension abilities which 
he held to be fundamental or basic to the later exploration of other kinds of 
behavioral intelligence. Concentrating on the cognition of behavioral units 
(CBU), classes (CBC), relations (CBR), systems (CBS), transformations (CBT), 
and implications (CBI), Guilford left for a future date the investigation of 
memory, divergent production, convergent production, and evaluation of behav-
ioral units, classes, relations, systems, transformations and implications. 
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The Six Factor Tests of Social Intelligence 
The present research utilized O'Sullivan and Guilford's (1966) six factor 
tests of social intelligence (x1 Cartoon Predictions; X2 Expression Grouping; 
x3 Missing Cartoons; X4 Missing Pictures; X5 Picture Exchange; and X6 Social 
Translations) as well as these same authors' suggested composite scores (~ CBS 
Composite of x3 and x4; x8 CBT Composite of x5 and x6; x9 Social Cognition 
Composite of x1 and x2 and x3 and x6) and one additional composite which origi-
nated with the author of the present research (x10 which is the sum of X1 
through x6). In their manual, O'Sullivan and Guilford (1966) present a norm-
ative silmmary of Test-Score Statistics which follows in Table 1. 
....--------------.. 
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TABLE 1 
Summary of Test-Score Statistics 
Test Variable Mean S. D. Reliability>:< Factor>:<>:< Factor 
First Second Loading 
X1 Cartoon Predictions 20.9 3.0 • 70 .68 • 55 CBI 
X2 Expression Grouping 19.1 3. 7 • 58 • 61 • 59 CBC 
X3 Missing Cartoons 18. 9 5.0 • 75 • 82 • 52 CBS 
X4 Missing Pictures . 13. 2 2. 6 • 48 • 46 • 58 CBS 
X5 Picture Exchange 9.6 2. 5 • 38 • 32 • 51 CBT 
X5 Social Translations 14.8 5.1 • 84 • 85 • 51 CBT 
X7 CBS Composite (X3 + X4) 32.1 6. 2 --- • 78 • 65 CBS 
X8 CBT Composite (X5 + X6) 24.2 6.2 --- .67 • 60 CBT 
X9 Social-cognition Composite 
(X1 + X2 + X3 + X5) 
73.0 1 3. 2 --- • 88 
I ~ 
>:•The first estimate of reliability was from the unrevised forms used in the factor analysis. 
>:<>:•For the unrevised forms. 
"' f-1 .
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rt is important to note that the six published tests used in the present re-
search only cover four of the social cognition abilities, namely for CBC 
(Expression Grouping); CBS (Missing Cartoons and Missing Pictures); CBT (Pic-
ture Exchange and Social Translation) and CBI (Cartoon Predictions). There is 
no published test which primarily measures CBU or CBR, cognition of behavior 
units or relations, respectively. The implications of this shortcoming for 
the most adequate testing of a developmental theory of social intelligence will 
be discussed later. 
The six factor tests of social intelligence, according to O'Sullivan and 
Guilford (1966) are different from previous social intelligence tests in two 
important ways: (1) In the attempt to reduce semantic or verbal variance, 
verbal statements and verbal responses are sparingly used. When they are used, 
they are clearly comprehensible with respect to verbal meaning but are slanted 
so as to refer to behavioral content. Graphic and photographic items are used 
almost exclusively, both in the informatio11 presented and in choices of 
responses. (2) The behavioral cognition tests were originally designed to 
measure abilities hypothesized by the Guilford SI model. In the initial 
factor analytic investigation (O'Sullivan, Guilford & de Mille, 1965) 
~ 
twenty-three tests were developed with the goal of measuring the six hypothe-
sized abilities: CBU, CBC, CBR, CBS, CBT, CBI. Most of these tests were 
reportedly more or less successful in measuring their intended factors and 
not others (O'Sullivan & Guilford, 1966). Six of the more successful tests 
were selected for publication, covering four of the social cognition abilities, 
for the psychological products of classes, systems, transformations, and 
implications. Two of the tests reportedly showed some incidental secondary 
variances with respect t6 the cognition of units and relations, also. Only 
.. 
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one of the twenty-three tests showed involvement with measurement of any se-
mantic ability to any appreciable extent, and the six published tests are, 
according to the authors, quite clear of abilities entering into the traditiona 
IQ tests. The sample of examinees from whom the analyzed test scores were 
obtained included 240 eleventh grade students, with IQs reportedly generally 
average and above, and from middle class Caucasian backgrounds. After the 
initial factor analysis (O'Sullivan et al., 1965) a number of minor changes 
were made in the factored tests, based upon information regarding the items 
that suggested improvements for the published forms. The changes, according to 
O'Sullivan and Guilford (1966), included the reordering of items to achieve 
better graduated item difficulty within parts of each test and more nearly 
equal part means and variances. A few items were dropped from some tests, and 
four new items were added to one test. Working time limits were reduced in 
two tests. The normative data presented in the manual (O'Sullivan & Guilford, 
1966) were obtai;;ed from administration of the revised test forms to a new 
sample of 266 tenth grade students. The information given in the manual with 
regard to factorial composition of the tests was derived from administration 
of the unrevised forms, but the authors assumed that in a similar analysis the 
revised forms would exhibit approximately the same factorial picture. Relia-
bility estimates for each test were derived from intercorrelations of separ-
ately timed halves, applying the Spearman-Brown formula. Results were given 
in the manual for both the original tests used in the factor analysis and for 
the revised forms that were administered for norms. Except in two instances, 
the reliabilities would ordinarily be considered to be too low for measurement 
of individuals, but attention is directed by the authors to the fact that the 
factor loadings for the single tests are all ahove .50 which is, in their 
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opinion, more relevant information concerning a test where the measurement of 
status on separate factors is the objective. Norm information is presented for 
all except the two tests with the lowest reliabilities. Reliability extimates 
for the three composite scores were derived by application of Mosier's formula 
for the reliability of a weighted sum of scores (Guilford, 1954, p. 393, cited 
in O'Sullivan & Guilford, 1966). Since the basic estimates of reliability of 
the components are of the internal consistency variety, the estimates for the 
composites are of the same kind. Because factor tests tend to show low inter-
correlations, and since the reliability of a composite is in direct proportion 
to those intercorrelations, the reliabilities of the composites are sometimes 
lower than the highest reliability of the components. 
The manual for the six factor tests of social intelligence contains fur-
ther pertinent information with regard to the validity of the tests, sex dif-
ferences, composite factor scores and a composite social cognition score. The 
six behavioral cognition tests are offered by the authors (O'Sullivan & 
Guilford, 1966) for experimental purposes on the basis of their demonstrated 
construct validities, as expressed in factor loadings on the respective 
factors. The tests had been factor analyzed along with 41 other aptitude 
measures, including semantic and visual figural tests and cognition, divergent-
production, and convergent-production tests. The factor analysis, according 
to the authors, demonstrated that the behavioral tests measure abilities other 
than those usually measured by verbal IQ tests and tests of other intellectual 
qualities. No data are available as yet concerning predictive validity, but. 
the authors report that selected behavioral tests are currently under study 
by other investigators as potential predictors of success of salesmen, Peace 
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corps trainees, probation workers, public contact personnel in a large industry 
and assistant motion picture directors. O'Sullivan and Guilford (l966) report-
ed that the preliminary results from some of these sources look promising in 
terms of the predictive value of behavioral cognition tests. 
With regard to sex differences, norms in the manual for the six factor 
tests of social intelligence are given for the two sexes combined because, as 
the authors note, none of the tests mentioned in the manual has a significant 
correlation with sex membership. Previous research, however, (e.g. Bronfen-
brenner et. at., 1958) has indicated a slight superiority of females in the per 
formance of tasks supposedly requiring social intelligence. 
For two of the factors, CBS and CBT, there are two different tests in the 
published battery. The opportunity therefore existed for combining pairs of 
scores, those from Missing Cartoons and Missing Pictures for CBS, and those 
from Picture Ex.change and Social Translations for factor CBT. The simple 
summing of the two scores from the two tests in each case gave estimated factor 
loadings for CBS and CBT essentially as large as would optimal differential 
weighting, thus unweighted sums were accepted as most meaningful by the 
authors. Factor loadings of the composites were estimated by application of th 
correlation of sums formulas (Guilford, 1965, p. 427). It is noted that where 
the factor loadings for CBS in variables x3 and x4 were .52 and .58, the 
loading for the sum of those two variables is estimated to be .65. Where the 
test loadings of x5 and ~ for factor CBT are both .51, the loading for the 
sum of the two is estimated to be .60. Both of the composites' loadings 
represent substantial increases. 
There reportedly are other advantages in the use of the composite scores 
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for factors. The sums give distinctly larger variances and this means greater 
discrimination among individuals in terms of scores. Another'important advan-
tage of combining scores is that the contributions of secondary factors are 
weduced. The loadings of .41 for CBU and .35 for CBI in Missing Cartoons 
~ere lowered to .31 and .32 in the CBS composite. The loading of .34 for CBR 
in Social Translations was reduced to .29 in the CBT composite. 
Although factor scores were recommended by O'Sullivan and Guilford {1966) 
as being more meaningful for research purposes, for applied work, in prediction 
. of complex performance criteria, for example, they felt that score variables 
involving a number of factors are more predictive. For the best overall com-
~osite for the measurement of social cognition aptitude now available, the 
composite represented in variable x9 was recommended, where x9 is equal to 
the sum of x1 plus x2 plus x3 plus x6. Four of the social cognition factors 
are well repr~sentec in this composite, with minor contributions from CBU 
(from Missing Cartoons) and CBR (from Social Translations). It was emphasized 
that, for the sake of accurate interpretation such a composite score does not 
measure all of social intelligence. There are also potential abilities of 
~emory for behavioral information, as well as divergent and convergent produc-
~ion, and evaluation as hypothesized from the SI model. The composite of four 
score variables may be said to measure social cognition ability only, with 
some weakness of coverage of CBU and CBR. Since traditional IQ tests tend to 
be restricted to cognition abilities, the composite is said to do for the 
behavioral area what verbal IQ tests do for the semantic area. 
The above discussion of the SI model and the six factor tests of social 
intelligence has provided a context for the elaboration of issues involved in 
.. 
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the present research. It has been stated earlier that the present research 
constitutes a normative study and developmental theory of.social intelligence. 
How is the present theory of social intelligence "developmental"? Just as 
there has been a neglect of definitive work on the concept of social intelli-
gence and social cognition, so there has been little investigation of develop-
ment along these lines (Guilford, 1967). Piaget, for example, has appeared to 
take it more or less for granted that if a child develops certain forms of 
firgural or semantic information, he is also capable of having the same forms 
~ith behavioral information (Flavell, 1963). Several studies concerned with 
the empathic ability of children from 3 to 6 years of age offer clues as to 
how empathy or social intelligence should develop through this age period. 
There is fairly general support, for example, for Piaget's (1929) description 
of the 3 year old as autistic and egocentric. Bridges (1931) found that social 
adjustment in nursery school children "between the ages of 2 and 5 years .•• pro-
gresses from being socially indifferent ••• through stages of self-assertiveness 
and interference with the liberty of others, to a stage in which they show 
consideration, sympathy, and kindness to others." Burns and Cavey (1957) stud-
ied the development of behavioral cognition under the heading of "empathic 
ability." In testing their predictions, the authors used a set of pictures to 
determine whether the child subject correctly inferred the feelings of a 
wortrayed figure in a particular situation (empathic response) or imputed to 
~he figure what his own feelings would be in that situation (egocentric or 
autistic response). Children in the age range from 3 to 6 1/2 were shown 
pictures of a child frowning at a birthday party and of a child smiling in the 
presence of a doctor with a hypodermic needle and were asked to cqmment. A 
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score of one point each was given if the examinee described the feeling of the 
child as shown and no point if he described his own feeling in such a situation. 
Children older than five were more likely to obtain scores of one and two pointE. 
Numerous practical and theoretical implications of this and the present 
research have been suggested. Increased understanding of the definition and 
development of social intelligence may enable us to devise and experiment with 
educational programs and techniques whose end is to facilitate the learning 
of social intelligence skills at the pre-school and primary grade age levels 
of development. Through the Human Development Program (Bessell & Palomares, 
1967) games like "You can make him feel good or bad," and "Can you guess 
what makes him mad," California laboratory groups of five-year olds are 
reportedly "beginning to understand the cause and effect relationship between 
the behavior of one person and the feelings produced in another person." The 
Human Development Program "games·," as described, are actually a carefully 
planned and administered program of curricula sequences and learning experience: 
aimed at promoting interpersonal effectiveness or social intelligence. 
As an attempted integration of the behavioral cognition aspect of the SI 
model and a developmental framework, the present research was concerned with 
the clarification of certain category relationships. In explicating the SI 
model, Guilford (1967) remains somewhat ambiguous about the relationships of 
the six categories of the product dimension having to do with the results of 
intellectual processing: CBU, CBC, CBR, CBS, CBT, CBI. For example, he 
asserts that CBU is the most basic, and that CBU is involved in CBI and CBT. 
The current state of research, he asserts, does not allow him to go beyond such 
general statements. Thus, there is no clearly developed hierarchy along lines 
of task complexity, no suggestion of a discernible vertical or horizontal 
progression according to difficulty, no delineated system of interactions 
for the six categories. 
Thus, category ambiguity, along with other factors mentioned in the 
preceding discussion prompted certain questions which served as major guide-
lines of this investigation: 
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1. If, as much factor analytic research suggests, behavioral cognition 
is a separate and distinct ability which can be isolated from other aspects of 
intellectual functioning, how and when does behavioral cognition emerge and 
develop? 
2. Can the ability for cognition of behavioral units (CBU), classes (CBC)! 
relations (CBR~ systems (CBS1 transformations (CBT1 and implications (CBI) be 
characterized by developmentally discernible structures and forms? Is there 
perhaps an order~v progression from the more basic (that is CBU and CBC) to 
the more complex (that is CBR, CBS, and CBT) which can be traced through a 
series of developmental phases which are defined by advances in chronological 
age? 
3. Would the hypothesized structures and forms in the cognition of be-
havioral information parallel or resemble the development of certain forms of 
figural and semantic information as reported by Piaget (1955, 1956, 1960) or 
the development of pre-conventional, conventional, and autonomous levels of 
moral cognition observed by Kohlberg (1964)? 
These major questions served to generate more specific hypotheses within the 
context of our research design. The hypotheses were as follows: 
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1. Behavioral cognition is a separate and distinct ability which can be 
isolated from other aspects of intellectual functioning. This represents a 
re-statement of O'Sullivan and Guilford's (1966) assertion that "these behavior-
al tests measure abilities other than those usually measured by verbal-IQ tests 
and tests of other intellectual qualities." The experimental verification of 
this statement would support the construct validity of the social intelligence 
tests. In the present research context, it was predicted that the six 
separate social intelligence tests would not correlate significantly with the 
Otis IQ as a measure of abstract or verbal intelligence. 
2. With regard to the question of sex differences, there were three 
possible alternatives, namely, female superiority, male superiority, or no sex 
difference in social intelligence. It was predicted that females would score 
significantly higher than males in the two final social intelligence composites 
because they had scored higher in certain of ti\e separate social intelligence 
tests. Although research results have been highly contradictory with regard 
to sex differences in social intelligence, we were persuaded to predict a 
female superiority by the findings of Bronfenbrenner et al. (1958) who, in 
what may be the most sophisticated and complex analysis of social intelligence, 
indicated a superiority of females in such tasks. 
3. A major developmental hypothesis predicted that seventeen year olds, 
as a group, would achieve significantly higher mean social intelligence com-
posite scores than the fourteen year old group, which would, in turn, do 
significantly better than the eleven year old group. This was dependent upon 
the corollary hypothesis that: a. on tests which purport to measure the more 
basic behavioral cognitions (X2 Expression Grouping, CBC), age groups should 
.. 
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not differ significantly; and b. On tests which purportedly measure the more 
complex behavioral cognitions, (X1, X3, X4, x5, X6) age groups should differ 
significantly. 
CHAPTER II 
Method 
.. 
Sub,j ects. A total of 300 subjects ( 50 males and 50 females at each of 
three grade levels: 6, 9, and 12) was randomly selected from class lists of 
their respective primary and secondary schools. Selection of schools (one 
primary and two secondary schools) all three of which share a two city block 
radius in Chicago represented an attempt to control those socio-economic and 
racial factors which might possibly affect the development of social intelli-
gence. All subjects were Caucasian and were drawn from a population known to 
e generally lower-middle to middle-middle in socio-economic class status. 
Materials. All subjects were pretested on the Otis IQ Test as a tradition 
al measure of intelligence. The Coleman Index (Coleman, 1959) was used to 
assign a social class rating to all subjects, from data supplied by school 
records and by the subjects themselves on a pretesting information sheet. The 
Coleman Index (Coleman, 1959) is based on a study of occupation and social 
class in Kansas City, and assigns various occupational groups to specific 
socioeconomic classes which are designated by numerical values ranging from 
1 (highest ~evel) to 7 (lowest level). The socioeconomic classes and their 
respective numerical values are as follows: (1) upper class; (2) upper 
iddle solid; (3) indeterminate middle class; (4) lower middle class; (5) upper 
lower class; (6) indeterminate lower class; (7) lower lower c~ass. The 
various occupational groups are listed under the following general categories: 
professional; business: managerial, clerical, sales; business: proprietors; 
blue collar: manual; blue collar: service; farm: owner, worker. The 
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assignment of any individual within an occupational category to a socioeconomic 
class is based upon these major criteria: degree of education or training 
required, level of advancement or status in a profession, business, or 
organizational structure; employee versus employer status; ownership versus 
non-ownership status; annual income earned; and clientele served. Several 
examples serve to illustrate briefly the manner of assigning ratings 
according to the Coleman Index. "Society" physicians and high income medical 
specialists with annual earnings above $22,500 are rated (1) as are manufactur-
ers and retailers with 50 or more employees and with annual sales of $1,000,000 
A rating of (1) is also given to farm owners with net incomes above $50,000 
and with property value at about $500,000. Physicians at medium success levels 
and with incomes from $10,000 to $22,000 are rated (2). Physicians with 
offices in primarily ethnic or working class areas are rated (3). Pharmacists 
owning the5.r own drugstores are also rated (3) while pharmacists employed by 
others are rated (4) as are registered nurses. Corporation officers and 
directors with incomes above $27,500 are rated (1). Semi-executives and 
managerial level employees such as sales managers and department heads with 
incomes between $12,500 and $22,500 are rated (2). Level (3) ratings are 
• given to business and government employees at semi-managerial levels with 
incomes of $7,000 to $10,000. 
In the present study, subjects were assigned Coleman Index ratings 
according to their fathers' occupations. This information regarding fathers' 
occupations was obtained from data supplied by school records.and by the 
subjects themselves on a pretesting information sheet. Those subjects whose 
fathers were deceased received no Coleman Index rating. 
LOYOLA 
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resulted in unequal Q.S for the six age-sex groupings (grade 6 female !l = 48; 
grade 6 male !l = 49; grade 9 female n = 47; grade 9 male !l = 49; grade 12 
female Q. = 44; grade 12 male !l = 47), and necessitated the use of Kramer's 
extension of Duncan's Range Test when applied to the differences between 
group means on Coleman Index ratings (McGuigan, 1960). 
All subjects were given group administrations of the six brief social 
intelligence tests developed by O'Sullivan and Guilford (1966). Thus, data 
collected on each subject included: sex, age, social class rating, 
tradional intelligence: Otis IQ, and the following social intelligence test 
variables: X1 Cartoon Predictions, x2 Expression Grouping, x3 Missing Cartoons 
X4 Missing Pictures, X5 Picture Exchange, X6 Social Translations, x7 CBS. 
Composite (X3 and X4), Xs CBT Composite (x5 and x6 ), x9 Social Cognition 
Composite I (x1 and x2 and x3 and x6), and x10 Social Cognition Composite 
(X1 through X6)• 
Procedure. The Otis IQ Test and the six factor tests of social intelli-
gence were given in that order, and were administered and scored in accordance 
with the specifications set down in their respective test manuals. The six 
factor tests of social intelligence were given in group testing sessions by 
the author in the Spring of 1969. Ratings according to the Coleman Index were 
made subsequent to the testing. 
CHAPTER III 
Results 
Besides providing descriptive statistics on thirteen variables which are 
relevant to the present study, Tables 2, 3, and 4 (for Grades 6, 9, and 12 re-
spectively) constitute an important collection of normative data on the tests 
of social intelligence which are presently in an experimental state of develop-
ment. The first three subject variables (age, socio-economic level, and abstract 
or traditional IQ), listed in each of Tables 2, 3, and 4, are those on which 
certain relationships must exist within and between groups before comparisons 
can be made with regard to the social intelligence subtests and composite 
scores which are ,represented by variables labelled X1 through X1o. 
First of all, it was necessary to demonstrate that a true developmental 
progression existed with regard to the three age-grade levels involved, in 
other words, that these were three distinct and separate age groups. Inspectior 
of the data provided in Tables 2, 3, and 4 revealed that this condition had 
been met and that the sufficiently different mean ages of grade 6, grade 9, 
and grade 12 subjects were 11.94, 14.86, and 17.86 respectively. Further, 
it was necessary to demonstrate that within the three grade levels (6, 9, and 
12),the mean ages of male and female subjects not be markedly different from 
each other. This would, of course, allow valid within-group comparisons. 
Inspection of the data in Table 2 revealed comparable age means of 11.95 and 
11.92 for grade 6 females and grade 6 males respectively. Similarly, Table 3 
shows comparable age means of 14.89 and 14.83 for grade 9 females and grade 
9 males respectively, and Table 4 shows comparable age means of 17.82 and 17.90 
for grade 12 females and grade 12 males respectively. Secondly, it was 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics on Relevant Variables for Grade 6 Subjects 
Age 
SE Rating 
Otis IQ 
Cart Pred X1 
Expr Grp X2 
Miss CartX3 
Miss Pie X4 
Pie Exch X5 
Soc Tran X5 
MC+ MP X7 
PE+ ST X8 
sec 1 X9 
sec n X10 
Female 
Mean S. D. 
11. 95 • 33 
4.58 • 93 
109.90 8.75 
16. 66 4.85 
15.56 3.48 
13. 76 3.94 
10.36 2. 74 
9.34 5.08 
12.08 5.61 
24.12 5.40 
20.82 6. 78 
58.06 11.00 
77.16 13.56 
Male 
Mean S.D. 
11.92 • 38 
4.61 • 94 
106.22 10. 06 
17.10 4.18 
14. 76 3.32 
. 13. 48 4.32 
9.58 2.65 
7.68 1. 98 
10.20 4.92 
23.06 6.06 
17. 88 5.22 
55.54 11. 28 
72.86 13. 22 
Total 
Mean S. D. 
11. 94 • 36 
4.60 • 94 
108.06 9.60 
16.88 4. 53 
15.16 3. 43 
13.62 4 .14 
9.97 2. 72 
8. 51 3. 95 
11.14 5. 36 
23.59 5. 77 
19.35 6. 23 
56.80 11. 22 
75.01 13. 56 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics on Relevant Variables for Grade 9 Subjects 
Age 
SE Rating 
Otis IQ 
Cart Pred X1 
Expr Grp x2 
Miss CartX3 
Miss Pie X4 
Pie Exch X5 
Soc Tran X5 
MC+ MP X7 
PE+ ST X8 
sec I X9 
sec rr X10 
Female 
Mean S. D. 
14.89 • 35 
4.60 .98 
113.82 9. 41 
21.56 2.93 
18.58 3.56 
17. 52 4. 73 
12.46 2.38 
9.02 2.26 
16.38 6. 13 
29.56 6.09 
25.34 6.19 
73.44 10. 80 
94.92 12. 98 
Male 
Mean 
14. 83 
4.67 
11 o. 92 
19.68 
18.80 
16.32 
11. 20 
9. 74 
13. 76 
27. 52 
23.52 
68.62 
89.16 
S. D. 
• 58 
• 77 
13. 31 
3.51 
3.53 
5.04 
2.90 
2.57 
4.93 
6.90 
6.60 
13. 24 
16. 14 
Total 
Mean 
14.86 
4.64 
112.37 
20.62 
18.69 
16.92 
11. 83 
9.38 
15.07 
28.54 
24.43 
71. 03 
92.04 
S. D. 
• 48 
• 88 
11. 62 
3.37 
3.55 
. 4. 92 
2. 72 
2.45 
5. 71 
6.59 
6.46 
12.32 
14.92 
38 • 
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TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics on Relevant Variables for Grade 12 Subjects 
Female Male Total 
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
Age 17. 82 • 33 1 7. eo • 33 7.86 • 33 
SE Rating 4.19 1.17 4.24 1. 04 4.22 1.11 
Otis IQ 109.10 9.49 115.08 9.01 112. 09 9. 72 
Cart Pred X1 22.18 3.49 22.86 2.59 22.i.52 3.09 
Expr Grp X2 19.64 3.12 18.86 3.26 19.25 3.22 
Miss Cart X3 18. 84 4. 79 18.64 3.90 18. 74 4. 37 
Miss Pie X4 13. 72 2.50 12.86 2.25 13.29 2. 41 
Pie Exch X5 9.80 2.13 9.38 2.28 9.59 2.22 
Soc Tran x6 17. 74 3.49 16.70 3. 73 17. 22 3.65 
MC+ MP X7 33.10 5. 71 31. 52 5.19 32. 31 5. 51 
PE+ ST X3 27. 54 4.29 26.08 4.87 26.81 4.65 
sec I X9 78.40 11. 03 77.06 8. 76 77. 73 9. 98 
sec II X10 101. 92 13.12 99.30 11. 07 100.61 12. 21 
~------------------~ 
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necessary that the mean socio-economic index not be significantly different 
from group to group. Results of Kramer's extension of Duncan's Test for 
unequal ns (McGuigan, 1960) contained in Table 5 show that no group mean was 
significantly different from any other group mean on the variable of socio-
economic class rating, for these groups: grade 6 female, grade 6 male, grade 
9 female, grade 9 male, grade 12 female, grade 12 male, respectively. Thus, 
randomization procedures successfully provided comparable experimental groups 
These groups met the necessary conditions for purposes of our study on the 
variables of age and socio-economic class. 
The procedure of random selection of subjects from class lists was only 
partially successful, however, in providing groups which were camparable with 
regard to the third subject variable, namely that of traditional or abstract 
intelligence as measured by the Otis IQ test. Results of the 2 X 3 analysis 
of variance for fixed variables (McGuigan, 1960) contained in Table 6 revealed 
significant effects for age and for the sex X age interaction on the Otis IQ 
Test. Females scored higher than males in grades 6 and 9, but males scored 
higher than females in grade 12. Results of the Duncan's Multiple Range 
Test (Edwards, 1968) contained in Table 7 indicate that the mean Otis IQ for 
grade 6 males is not significantly different from that for grade 6 females. 
The same is true for grade 9 females and males. Thus, it is safe to expect 
unequivocal interpretations of any differences with regard to performance on 
social intelligence tests between the sexes for grades 6 and 9. Again, in 
Table 7, the mean Otis IQ score for grade 12 males was not significantly 
different from that of grade 9 females, grade 9 males, or gr.ade 6 females. 
Further, the mean Otis IQ score for grade 9 females was not significantly 
~ 
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TABLE 5 
Duncan's New Multiple Range Test Applied to the Difference Between Group 
Means on Socioeconomic Class Rating for Grade 6 Females, Grade 6 Males, 
Grade 9 Females, Grade 9 Males, Grade 12 Females, Grade 12 Males>:' 
Any two group means not underscored by the same line are significantly 
different. 
Any two group means unders.cored?:ythe same line are not significantly 
different. >:<>:<>:< 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
A B c D E F 
Grade 12 Grade 12 Grade 6 Grade 9 Grade 6 Grade 9 
Female Male Female Female Male Male 
Means 4.19 4.24 4.58 4.60 4.61 4.67 
A 4.19 • 05 • 39 • 41 • 42 • 48 
.54 • 56 .58 • 59 .60 
• 34 • 36 .37 • 43 
B 4.24 • 53 • 56 .57 • 58 
• 02 • 03 • 09 
c 4.58 • 53 • 55 • 56 
• 01 .07 
D 4.60 • 53 .55 
• 06 
E 4.61 • 52 
*** 
>:'Procedure followed was Kramer's extension of Duncan's Range Test for 
unequal ~s (F. J. McGuigan 1960, pp. 185-187). 
>:<>:<At each intersect two figures are reported. The top figure is the 
difference between the two group M's. The bottom figure is the 
shortest significant range calculated separately for each case of 
2 M's due to unequal ~'s. 
.. 
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TABLE 6 
Analysis of Variance on the Effects of Sex, Age, and Sex x Age Interaction 
on Subject Performance on Otis IQ Test 
Source of Variance SS df MS F p 
- - -- -
Sex 3. 00 1 3.00 • 03 NS 
Age 1163 • 23 2 581.61 5.57 <. 01 
Interaction 1439 • 90 2 719. 95 6.89 (. 01 
Within Group 30720 • 20 294 104.49 
Total 33, 326 • 33 299 
-
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TABLE 7 
Duncan's New Multiple Ranges Test Applied to the Differences 
between Group Means for Grades 6, 9, and 12 Females 
and Males on the Otis IQ Test 
Any two treatment means not underscored by the same line are 
significantly different. 
Any two treatment means underscored by the same line are not 
significantly different. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
A B c D E F Shortest 
Grade 6 Grade 12 Grade 6 Grade 9 Grade 9 Gradel2 Significant 
Male Female Female Male Female Male Ranges 
Means 106.22 109.10 J09. 90 110. 92 113.82 115.08 
A 106.22 4. 70 7. 60 . 8. 86 R2 =5.37 
B 109.10 4. 72 5.98 R3 = 5. 59 
c 109.90 3.92 5.18 R4 = 5. 75 
D 110.92 
' 
4.16 R5 = 5. 86 
E 113.82 1.26 R6 = 5. 96 
.. 
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different from that of grade 12 females, grade 12 males, grade 9 females, 
grade 9 males, or grade 6 females. Thus significant differences in Mean Otis 
IQ scores were found for only the following groups: grade 9 females and grade 
6 males, grade 12 males and grade 12 females, grade 12 males and grade 6 
males. For these groups, interpretation of any group differences in social 
intelligence test scores will have to be qualified. 
A major hypotheses, concerned with the construct validity of the six 
social intelligence tests, predicted that these tests would not correlate 
significantly with Otis IQ as a measure of abstract or traditional intelligence 
Tables 8, 9 and 10 contain the critical Pearson product-moment correlation 
co-efficients (McNemar, 1962) computed between Otis IQ and the six tests of 
social intelligence for all subjects (males and females combined) in grades 
6, 9, and 12 respectively. Tables 11, 12, and 13 contain !_S computed for 
males and ftmales separately for each of the three age-grade groups. Results 
of Table 8 indicated that the Pearson !_S between Otis IQ and five of the six 
social intelligence tests were statistically significant. ·This appears to 
be largely an artifact due to the large !!,S involved. Most importantly, the 
correlation coefficients reported in Table 8 account for almost negligible 
amounts of variance. As McNemar (1962) notes, a Pearson !.. can be statistically 
significant but not really meaningful if the amount of variance·accounted for 
is not sufficient. For example, the highest !... reported for Otis IQ and any 
single social intelligence test (Cartoon Predictions) in Table 8 is .35 which· 
accounts for only 12 per cent of the variance. The only Pearson rs which 
were statistically significant and which also appeared to account for a 
sufficient amount of the variance are .45 and .46, for composites sec I and 
TABLE 8 1 
Pearson rs on Variables for Grade 6 Females and Males Combined* 
-
OTIS Soc Cart Miss Exp!' Miss Pict MC+ ST+ sec sec 
IQ Tran Pred Cart Grp Pict Exe MP PE I II 
OTIS IQ 1. 00 • 34d • 35d • 22b • 20b • • 28d -. 01 .29d .36d • 45d • 46d 
Soc 
Tran 1. 00 • 21b .18a -.03 • 30d • 06 • 27d .93d .6ld .60d 
Cart 
Pred 1. 00 • 40d .18a .30d .13 • 43d • 30d • 7ld • 70d 
Miss 
Cart 1. 00 • 41d • 39d -.02 .90d .19a • 74d • 70d 
Expr 
Grp 1. 00 • 27d -.02 • 50d -.03 • 51d • 48d 
. 
Miss 
Pict 1. 00 • 06 • 75d • 3ld • 49d • 63d 
Pict 
Ex ch 1. 00 • 01 • 30d .07 .18a 
MC+MP 1. 00 • 28d • 76d • 80d 
ST+PE 1. 00 • 62d .67d 
sec I 1. 00 • 97d 
sec n 1. 00 
>:ca = P < • 05 
b ~ P-(. 025 
c=P:(.010 
---d = p <. 005 
--
~ 
..i::-
.r:-
• 
,, 
TABLE 9 
Pearson rs on Variables for Grade 9 Females and Males Combined >:< 
-
.. 
OTIS Soc Car Miss Exp Miss Pie MC+ ST··!- sec sec 
IQ Tran Pred Cart Grp Pie Exe MP PE I II 
OTIS IQ 1. 00 • 43d .48d .51d • 45d • 27d .56d • 46d .62d .64d • 67d 
Soc 
Tran 1. 00 .41d .23c • 23c • 31d .28d • 29d • 76d • 61d .60d 
Car 
Pred 1. 00 • 53d • 32d .43d • 20b, • 56d • 43d • 74d • 73d 
Miss 
Cart 1. 00 • 39d .45d .29d • 90d • 39d • 76d • 76d 
Expr 
Grp 1. 00 • 36d • 52d • 43d • 42d .62d • 67d. 
Miss 
Pict 1. 00 .18a . 74d • 30d • 50d .63d 
Pict 
Ex ch 1. 00 • 32d • 61d • 43d • 55d 
MC+MP 1. 00 • 35d • 75d • 81d 
ST+PE 1. 00 • 75d • 76d 
sec r 1. 00 • 97d 
sec II 1. 00 
>!<a = ;p~ • 05 ~ 
b = P< • 025 
--
' 
I c=P<.010 
--d = :P5.. 005 ..i::-\J1 
. 
TABLE 10 
·~ 
Pearson rs on Variables for Grade 12 Females and Males Combined* 
-
OTIS Soc Car Miss Exp Miss Pie MC+ ST+ sec sec 
IQ Tran Pred Cart Grp Pie Exe MP PE I II 
OTIS IQ 1. 00 • 24c • 35d .30d .15 • 08 • 22b • 2lb • 29d • 37d • 36d 
Soc 
Tran 1.00 • 22b • 29d • 20b • 24c • 21b • 35d • 89d .63d .60d 
Car 
Pred 1. 00 • 43d • 26d .16 • 24c • 40d • 28d • 66d • 6ld 
Miss 
Cart 1. 00 • 42d • 33d • 35d • 89d • 39d • 8ld • 79d 
Expr ' 
Grp 1. 00 .33d • 27d • 46d • 29d • 66d .65d 
. 
Miss 
Pict 1. 00 .25d .64d • 31d • 39d • 56d 
Pict 
Ex ch 1. 00 • 45d .64d • 39d .55d 
MC+MP 1. 00 • 49d • 79d • 85d 
ST+PE 1. 00 • 68d • 73d 
sec I 1. 00 • 97d. 
sec II 1. 00 
>:<a = P( • 05 
--b = P<. 025 
--
c = p~. 010 
d = P<. 005 • 
--
.i::-
O'\ 
. 
TABLE 11 
_,, 
Pearson rs on Variables for Grade 6 Females and Grade 6 Males ,:, 
- .. , ... ..,,,. 
.......... 
OTIS Soc Car Miss Exp Miss Pie MC• ST+ sec sec 
IQ Tran Pred Cart Grp Pie Exe MP PE I II 
OTIS 1. 00 • 18 • 31b .24a • 01 • 21 -.11 . 28b . 22 • 32b • 34c 
IQ 1. 00 • 47d .43d • 20 .34c • 31b • 90 .28b . 47d .54d • 54d 
Soc 1. 00 • 09 • 02 -. 07 • 40d • 05 • 22 • 93d • 53d • 57d 
Tran 1. 00 • 40d . 35d -.03 .14 -. 05 • 31b • 93d .69d .62d 
Car 1. 00 • 37d • 21 • 32b • 09 • 43d .19 • 69d • 68d 
Pred 1. 00 • 44d .16 • 31b • 34c . 45d • 51d • 76d • 76d 
Miss 1. 00 .53d • 29b -.08 • 87d .04 • 70d .64d 
Cart 1. 00 • 29b • 49d • 08 .93d • 36d . 77d • 78d 
Expr 1. 00 • 15 -.06 • 46d -.07 • 56d . • 48d . 
Grp 1. 00 • 38d -. 03 .37d -.04 • 45d • 46d 
Miss 1. 00 • 04 • 72d . 40d • 49d .64d 
Pict 1. 00 • 02 • 78d .14 • 47d • 61d 
Pict 1. 00 -.04 .26a .02 .13 
Ex ch 1. 00 .07 • 34c .13 • 27a 
MC+ 1. 00 • 23 • 76d • 79d 
MP 1. 00 • 32b • 76d • 82d 
ST+ 1. 00 • 55d. • 64d 
PE 1. 00 • 70d • 69d 
sec !:88 .: ~1g I 
sec 1. 00 
II 1. 00 
>:'a == P~ • 050; b == P < . 025; c == P < • 010; d = P (. 005 
-- -- -- --
, 
>:0 :'At each intersect are 2 rs; the top r is for the 50 females of the 6th grade and the bottom r is for the 
- - - .i::-50 males of the 6th grade. -;i 
. 
TABLE 12 1 .'1 
Pearson rs* on Variables for Grade 9 Females and Grade 9 Males>:•>:< 
-
Otis Soc Car Miss Exp . Miss Pie MC+ ST+ sec sec 
IQ Tran Pred Cart Grp Pie Ex ch MP PE I II 
OTIS 1. 00 • 25a • 38d • 34c .42d -.04 • 54d • 18 • 51d • 52d .52d 
IQ 1. 00 • 60d .53d .62d . 50d • 42d .63d .63d .69d • 71d • 74d 
"" Soc 1. 00 • 28b • 08 .10 • 29b . 16 .16 .61d • 46d . 47d 
Tran 1. 00 • 48d .37d • 39d .27a • 51d • 38d • 94d . 75d . 73d 
Car 1. 00 • 47d • 21 .27a • 22 • 45 • 35d .68d .65d 
Pred 1. 00 • 46d • 47d • 48d .28b .61d • 46d . 76d • 75d 
Miss 1. 00 • 30b • 38d • 09 • 87d • 27a • 76d • 72d 
Cart 1. 00 • 49d • 47d • 50d .93d • 47d • 76d • 79d 
Expr 1. 00 .24a • 46d • 31b • 33c .60d .62d 
Grp 1. 00 • 49d .57d • 56d • 52d • 68d • 74d . 
Miss 1. 00 .14 .69d • 23 • 42d • 56d 
Pict 1. 00 • 28b • 77d • 31b • 51d .65d 
Pict 1. 00 .17 • 50d .37d • 51d 
Ex ch 1. 00 • 48d • 77d • 56d .65d 
MC+ 1. 00 .17 • 7ld • 75d 
MP 1. 00 • 48d • 77d . 85d 
ST+ 1. 00 .69d • 70d 
PE 1. 00 • 78d • 80d 
sec 1. 00 • 97d 
I 1. 00 • 96d 
rfC 1. 00 1. 00 
•:•At each intersect are 2 _::s; the top_:: is for the 50 females of the 9th grade and the bottom_:: is for the 
~ 
50 males of the 9th grade. 
>:•>:•a= Ps. o5o; b = P~ • 025; c = P5 • 010; d = P~. 0005 &; 
. 
..., 
TABLE 13 
Pearson rs on Variables for Grade 12 Females and Grade 12 Males>:< 
- >!c:i:c 
OTIS Soc Car Miss Exp Miss Pie MC+ ST+ sec sec 
IQ Tran Pred Cart Grp Pie Ex ch MP PE I II 
OTIS 1. 00 • 28b • 37d • 46d .24a .11 .14 .35d . 30b • 47d . 44d 
IQ 1. 00 • 31b • 30b .15 .16 .19 • 38d . 20 • 42d • 35d • 39d 
Soc 1. 00 • 28b • 37d .19 • 28b • 45d • 87d .62d .59d 
Tran 1. 00 • 20 • 20 .19 .16 • 27a . 22 • 89d .64d .60d 
Car 1. 00 • 45d • 3lb .19 • 28b • 46d • 36d • 69d .66d 
Pred 1. 00 • 41d .24a • 19 .23a • 38d • 26a .65d .60d 
Miss 1. 00 .65d • 30b • 36d .88d • 48d .88d . 85d 
Cart 1. 00 .15 .38d • 33c • 92d • 31b ·• 71d • 7ld 
Expr 1. 00 • 30b • 37d .63d • 34c • 72d • 73d 
Grp 1. 00 • 34c • 17 • 26a • 22 • 59d . 57d . 
Miss 1. 00 .16 • 57d • 31b • 36d • 52d 
Pict 1. 00 • 32b • 72d • 27b • 42d • 60d 
Pict 1. 00 • 49d • 59d • 39d • 53d . 
Ex ch 1. 00 • 39d • 68d .39d • 58d 
.MC+ 1. 00 .61d • 85d • 90d 
MP 1. 00 • 35d • 71d • 79d 
ST+ 1. 00 • 70d • 74d 
PE 1. 00 • 68d • 73d 
sec 1. 00 • 97d 
I 1. 00 • 96d 
sec 1. 00 
II 1. 00 t 
>:< a = P< • 05; b = P<. 025; c = P<. 010; d :::: P<. 005 
-- --- -- --
~:<*At each intersect are 2 rs; the top r is for the 50 females of the 12th grade and the bottom r is for the 
- - - +:"" 50 males of the 12th grade. 'f' 
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sec II respectively. However, these composites do not represent the most 
valid criteria for testing the above mentioned hypothesis. Rather, the 
critical r..s involved in testing the hypothesis are the 6 rs between Otis IQ 
and each of the separate tests of social intelligence. If, following McNemar's 
. -
(1962) rationale, it is agreed that .45 is the lowest acceptable significant 
r as it accounts for a sufficient amount of variance (20 per cent), then none 
of the critical correlations between Otis IQ and the six separate tests of 
social intelligence in Table 8 or Table 10 (for grades 6 and 12 respectively) 
were sufficient to warrant rejection of our hypothesis. However, four of the 
six critical correlations in Table 9 (for grade 9) were statistically 
significant and account for a sufficient amount of variance. Thus, the 
hypothesis was only partially confirmed. 
A second major hypothesis of the present study predicted that females 
score significantlJ higher than males in the two final social intelligence 
composites (sec I and sec II) because they had scored higher in certain of the 
separate social intelligence tests. Results of the analysis of variance for 
the effects of sex, age, and sex x age interaction on Social Cognition 
Composite I contained in Table 14 revealed that social intelligence was 
related to sex membership (F = 5.00; df = l; E_f .05). Results of the analysis 
of variance for the effects of sex, age, and sex X age interaction on Social 
Cognition Composite II contained in Table 16 revealed that the effect for sex 
was again significant (F = 7.28; df = l; E.~·05). Tables 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 
28, 30 32, respectively, contain the results of the analyses of variance for 
the effects of sex, age, and sex X age interaction on the following six 
separate social intelligence tests and two minor composite scores: Cartoon 
. 51. 
TABLE 14 
Analysis of Variance on the Effects of Sex. Age. and Sex x Age 
Interaction on Subject Performance on Social Cognition Composite I 
Source of Variance SS df MS F £__ 
- - - -
Sex 627.87 1 627. 87 5.00 <. 05 
-
Age 22848.27 2 11424.13 90.95 <. 001 
Interaction 156.57 2 78.29 .62 NS 
Within Groups 36930.16 294 125.61 
Total 60562.87 299 
. 
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TABLE 15 
Duncan's New Multiple Range Test Applied to the Differences Between 
Group Means for Grades 6, 9, and 12 on the Social Cognition Composite I 
Any two treatment means not underscored by the same line are significantly 
different. 
Any two treatment means underscored by the same line are not significantly 
different. 
.1 2 3 
A B c Shortest 
Grade 6 Grade 9 Grade 12 Significant 
Means 56.80 71. 03 77. 73 Ranges 
A 56.80 14.23 20.93 R2 = 4. 15 
B 71. 03 6.70 R3 = 4. 32 
53. 
TABLE 16 
Analysis of Variance on the Effects of Sex, Age, and Sex x Age 
futeraction on Subject Performance on Social Cognition Composite II 
Source of Variance SS df MS F p 
- - -- -
Sex 1339.87 1 1339.87 7. 28 s . 05 
Age 33960.87 2 16980.43 92.27 ~ • 001 
futeraction 123.33 2 61. 67 0.34 NS 
Within Groups 54103.40 294 184.03 
Total 89527.47 299 
.. 
-
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TABLE 17 
Duncan's New Multiple Range Test Applied to the Differences Between 
Group Means for Grades 6, 9, and 12 on the Social Cognition Composite II 
Any two treatment means not underscored by the same line are significantly 
different. 
Any two treatment means underscored by the same line are not significantly 
different. 
1 2 3 
A B c Shortest 
Grade 6 Grade 9 Grade 12 Significant 
Means 75.01 92.04 100.61 Ranges 
A 75.01 17. 03 25.60 R2 = 5. 04 
B 92.04 8.57 R3 = 5. 25 
55. 
TABLE 18 
Analysis of Variance on the Effects of Age .. Sex .. and Sex x Age Interaction 
on Subject Performance for Cartoon Predictions Test 
Source of Variance SS df MS F p 
-
.• 
- - -
Sex 4.81 1 4. 81 0.35 NS 
Age 1646.91 2 823.45 59.95 < .001 
-
Interaction 99.95 2 49.97 3.64 < • 05 
-
Within Groups 4038.32 294 13. 74 
Total 5789.99 299 
, 
.. 
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TABLE 19 
Duncan's New Multiple R.ange Test Applied to the Difference Between 
Group Means for Grades 6. 9, and 12. Females and Males, on the Cartoon 
Predictions Test 
.Any two treatment means not underscored by the same line are significantly 
different • 
.Any two treatment means underscored by the same line are not significantly 
different. 
.. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
A B c D E F Shortest 
Grade 6 Grade 6 Grade 9 Grade 9 Grade 12 Grade 12 Significant 
Female Male Male Female Female Male Ranges 
Means 16.66 17.10 19.68 21.56 22.18 22.86 
A 16.66 • 44 3.02 4.90 5.52 6.20 R.2 "'" 1. 96 
B 17.10 2.58 4.46 5.08 5. 76 R.3 ::'. 2. 05 
c 19.68 1. 88 2.50 3. 18 R.4 ::: 2. 10 
D 21.56 • 62 1. 30 R.5 = 2. 14 
E 22.18 R.6 "' 2. 18 
' 
. 
.. 
57 • 
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TABLE 20 
Analysis of Variance on the Effects of Sex,, Age,, and Sex x Age Interaction 
on Subject Performance on Expression Grouping Test 
. 
Source of Variance SS df MS F p 
·.-.. ~. ...... . . 
--· - -
Sex 15.41 1 15.51 1. 32 NS 
Age 983.42 2 491. 71 42.08 <. 001 
-
Interaction 17. 01 2 8.50 o. 73 NS 
Within Groups 3435.16 294 11.68 
Total 4451.00 299 
58. 
TABLE 21 
Duncan's New Multiple Range Test Applied to the Differences Between 
Group Means for Grades 6, 9, and 12 on the Expression Grouping Test 
Any two treatment means not underscored by the same line are significantly 
different. 
Any two treatment means underscored by the same line are not significantly 
different. 
1 2· 3 
A B c Shortest 
Grade 6 Grade 9 Grade 12 Significant 
Means 15.16 18.69 19.25 Ranges 
A 15.16 3.53 4.09 R2 '== I. 26 
B 18.69 • 56 R3 = 1. 31 
. 59 • 
TABLE 22 
Analysis of Variance on the Effects of Age, Sex, and Sex x Age 
Interaction on Subject Performance on Missing Cartoons Test 
.. . .... 
Source of Variance SS df MS F p 
... 
··-
. --..- .. 
·- -
Sex 23.52 1 23.52 1.15 NS 
Age 1347.23 2 673.61 32.98 <. 001 
-
Interaction 15.44 2 7.72 • 38 NS 
Within Groups 6005.20 294 20.43 
Total 7391.39 299 
. 
.. 
TABLE 23 
Duncan's New Multiple R.ange Test Applied to the Difference Between 
Group Means for Grades 6, 9, and 12 on the Missing Cartoons Test 
60. 
Any two treatment means not underscored by the same line are significantly 
different. · 
Any two treatment means underscored by the same line are not significantly 
different. 
1 2 3 
A B c Shortest 
Grade 6 Grade 9 Grade 12 Significant 
Means 13. 62 16~ 92 18 •. 74 Ranges 
A 13.62 3.30 5.12 R2 ::: 1. 67 
B 16.92 1.82 R2 "' 1. 74 
F 
TABLE 24 
Analysis of Variance on the Effects of Sex, Age, and Sex x Age 
Interaction on Subject Performance on Missing Pictures Test 
Source of Variance SS df MS F p 
- ··-
~
·-
Sex 70.08 1 70.08 10. 34 <. 01 
-
.. 
Age 553.79 2 276~89 40.86 <. 001 
-
Interaction 3. 31 2 1. 65 0.24 NS 
Within Group 1992.22 294 
Total 2619.40 299 6.78 
61. 
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TABLE 25 
Duncan's New Multiple Range Test Applied to the Differences Between 
Group Means for Grades 6, 9, and 12 on the Missing Pictures Test 
Any two treatment means not underscored by the same line are significantly 
different. 
Any two treatment means underscored by the same line are not significantly 
different. 
~ . . ..... --·-· .. . . 
1 2 3 
A B c Shortest 
Grade 6 Grade 9 Grade 12 Significant 
Means 9. 97 11. 83 13.29 Ranges 
A 9.97 1. 86 3.32 R2 ::: .96 
B 11. 83 1.46 R3 = 1. 03 
.. 
63. 
-
TABLE 26 
Analysis of Variance on the Effects of Sex, Age, and Sex x Age 
Interaction on Subject Performance on Picture Exchange Test 
. ~ .. 
-· ·-
..-
Source of Variance SS df MS F p 
-
.-.--- ... · .. 
- -
Sex 15.41 1 15.41 1. 77 NS 
Age 65.58 2 32.79 3.77 < .05 
Interaction 70.85 2 35.42 4.07 < . 05 
-
Within Groups 2558.48 294 8.70 
Total 2710.32 299 
. 
., 
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TABLE 27 
Duncan's New Multiple Range Test Applied to the Differences Between 
Group Means for Grades 6, 9, and 12, Females and Males, on the 
Picture Exchange Test 
Any two treatment means not underscored by the same line are significantly 
different. 
Any two treatment means underscored by the same line are not significantly 
different. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
A B c D E F Shortest 
Grade 6 Grade 9 Grade 6 Grade 12 Grade 9 Grade 12 Significant 
Male FP-male Female Male Male Female Ranges 
Means 7, 68 9.02 9.34 9.38 9. 74 9. 80 
A 7. 68 1. 34 1.66 1. 70 2.06 2.12 R2 = 1. 56 
B 9.02 • 32 • 36 • 72 • 78 R3 "'1. 62 
c 9.34 R4 = 1. 67 
D 9.38 R5 = 1. 70 
E 9. 74 R5 = 1. 73 
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TABLE 28 
Analysis of Variance on the Effects of Age, Sex, and Sex x Age 
Interaction on Subject Performance for Social Translations Test 
. ···.- .. -
Source of Variance SS df MS F p 
--. -- - -
Sex 255. 76 1 255.76 10.48 ~. 01 
Age 1901.13 2 950.56 38.94. < .001 
-
Interaction 31.25 2 15.62 . 64 NS 
Within Groups 71 76. 70 294 24. 41 
. 
Total 9364.84 299 
.. 
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TABLE 29 
Duncan's New Multiple Range Test Applied to the Differences Between 
Group Means for Grades 6, 9, and 12 on the Social Translations Test 
Any two treatment means not underscored by the same line are significantly 
different. 
Any two treatment means underscored by the same line are not significantly 
different. 
.-
. . 
1 2 3 
A B c Shortest 
Grade 6 Grade 9 Grade 12 Significant 
Ranges 
Means 11. 14 15.07 17. 22 
A 11.14 3.93 6.08 R2 = 1. 81 
B 15.07 2. 15 R3 ~ 1. 89 
.. 
TABLE 30 
Analysis of Variance on the Effects of Sex, Age, and Sex x Age Interaction 
on Subject Performance on Combined Score of Missing Cartoons and 
Missing Pictures 
Source of Variance SS df MS l F p 
-
... 
·- -
-
Sex 182.52 1 182.52 5.11 < • 05 
-
Age 3825.13 2 1912.56 53.50 < . 001 
-
Interaction 12.02 2 6.01 0.17 NS 
Within Group 10509.88 294 35. 75 
Total 14529.55 299 
. . -... ~ .. . . .. .. 
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TABLE 31 
Duncan's New Multiple Range Test Applied to the Differences Between 
Group Means for Grades 6, 9, and 12 on the Combined Score of Missing 
Cartoons and Missing Pictures 
Any two treatment means not underscored by the same line are significantly 
different. 
Any two treatment means underscored by the same line are not significantly 
different. 
1 2 3 
A B c Shortest 
Grade 6 Grade 9 Grade 12 Significant 
Means 23.59 28.54 32.31 Ranges 
A 23.59 4.95 8. 72 R2 = 2. 22 
B 28.54 3. 77 R3 = 2. 32 
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TABLE 32 
Analysis of Variance on the Effects of Sex, Age, and Sex x Interaction 
on Subject Performance on Combined Score of Picture Exchange 
and Social Translations 
.... ..... 
·-·· ··-···· 
Source of Variance SS (ff MS F p 
··-
.. __....... 
···-
-- . 
Sex 322.40 1 322.40 9. 61 <. 01 
Age 2904.08 2 1452.04 43.28 ~. 001 
Interaction 29. 79 2 14. 89 • 44 NS 
Within Group 9864.46 294 33.55 
Total 13120. 73 299 
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TABLE 33 
Duncan's New Multiple Range Test Applied to the Differences Between 
Group Means for Grades 6, 9, and 12 on the Combined Scores of Picture 
Exchange and Social Translation 
Any two treatment means not underscored by the same line are significantly 
different. 
Any two treatment means underscored by the same line are not significantly 
different. 
1 2 
A B 
Grade 6 Grade 9 
Means 19. 35 24.43 
··-· 
- ...... ....... . ~ ~ .. ..... 
A 19. 35 5.08 
B 24. 43 
3 
c 
Grade 12 
26.81 
... .... ··~ . 
·:. 46 
2.38 
Shortest 
Significant 
Ranges 
R3 ::: 2. 20 
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Predictions x1 , Expression Grouping x2 , Missing Cartoons x3 , Missing Pictures 
X4, Picture Exchange x5, Social Translations X6, CBS Composite x7 , and CBT 
Composite Xa· The main effect for sex membership was significant for the 
following four of the total of eight analyses: Missing Pictures X4 (Table 24); 
Social Translations X6 (Table 28); CBS Composite X7 (Table 30); and CBT 
Composite x8 (Table 32). Females were higher in all of these cases. 
A third major hypothesis of the present study predicted a significant 
effect for age in the two final social intelligence composites (SCC I and 
sec II). In other words, it was predicted that the 17 year-olds as a group 
achieve significantly higher mean social intelligence composite scores than 
the 14 year-old group who would in turn do significantly better than the 
eleven year olds. Results of the analyses of variance for the effects of sex, 
age, and sex X age interactions on social cognition composite I contained in 
Table lli revealed that the null hypothesis of no significant age effect was 
rejected at the .001 level. Table 16 for social cognition composite II 
revealed that the same null hypothesis was again rejected at the .001 level. 
However, an unequivocal interpretation of a significant age effect as 
confirmation of a developmental hierarchy hypothesis depended upon confirmation 
of corollary hypotheses. Namely, it was predicted that on the test which 
allegedly measured the most basic behavioral cognition (Expression Grouping X2 
for Cognition of Behavioral Classes CBC), age groups should not differ 
significantly. Results of the analysis of variance for the effects of sex, 
age, and sex X age interaction on Expression Grouping as contained in Table 20 
revealed that a significant age effect was found where it was not expected. 
The second corollary hypothesis predicted a significant age effect on those 
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social intelligence tests which allededly measure the more complex behavioral 
cognitions, namely: Cartoon Predictions X1 , Missing Cartoons x3 , Missing 
Pictures X4, Picture Exchange x5, and Social Translations X6. Tables 18, 
~ 
22, 24, 26, and 28 reveal that the significant age effect was found for subject 
performance on all five social intelligence tests for which it was predicted. 
Tables 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, and 33 contain the results of the 
Duncan's Range tests, whose application was indicated by the above-mentioned 
analyses of variance, and whose implications will be treated in detail in the 
Chapter IV Discussion. 
CHAPTER IV 
Discussion 
Since there is a paucity of published normative data on the six factor 
tests of social intelligence which have been explicitly "offered for experi-
mental purposes" by their authors {O'Sullivan & Guilford, 1966), the test 
score statistics resulting from the present research constitute an important 
potential source of additional normative data. For that reason, it is necessar1 
to briefly describe certain similarities and differences between these two 
sources, with regard to populations tapped, controls exercised, and the manner 
and degree of detail with which test score statistics are reported. 
It will become apparent that, despite certain differences, the normative 
data collected by these two sources are generally comparable and serve to 
supplement each other. In the ·manual for the six factor tests of social intel-
ligence (O'Sulli~an & Guilford, 1966), the authors noted that the test score 
statistics were derived from administration of the battery to 11 266 tenth grade 
students ••• with IQ' s generally average and above." There were reportedly 
several Oriental and Mexican-American students in the group but no Negroes. 
The norms are given for the two sexes combined. No comment is offered with 
regard to the socio-economic class status of subjects, and no specific indivi-
dual or group scores on traditional intelligence tests were given. With 
regard to racial composition, there was evidently no attempt to· insure that the 
normative group was wholly homogeneous (e.g., all Negro or all C~ucasian) or 
representatively heterogeneous (The group included Orientals apd Caucasians, 
but no Negroes ) • 
.. 
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In deliberate contrast, the present study attempted to control for sex, 
racial, socio-economic, and traditional IQ factors which. ~ight influence 
social intelligence test performance. Thus all subjects were middle-class 
Caucasians of average and above intelligence for whom specific group 
statistics on these important social, class, and IQ variables are reported 
for the sexes combined and separated at each of three grade levels: 6, 9, and 
12, or ages eleven, fourteen, and seventeen respectively. Having briefly 
outlined differences and similarities with regard to populations tapped, 
controls exercised, and the reporting of test score statistics, the manner in 
which descriptive data from the present research are supplementary to already 
published data can be illustrated. 
As seen in Table 1, the group means reported for the tenth grade students 
in the manual were as follows: x1 Cartoon Predictions 20.9; X2 Expression 
Grouping 19.1; x3 Missing Cartoons 18.9; X4 Missing Pictures 13.2; X5 
Picture Exchange 9.6; X6 Social Translations 14.8; X7 CBS Composite (X3 + X4) 
32.1; CBT Composite (x5 + X6) 24.2; and x9 SCC I (X1 + X2 + X3 + X6) 73.0. 
Inspection of the data in Tables 2, 3, and 4, for the total (males and females 
combined) grades 6, 9, and 12 respectively indicated that our sixth graders 
achieved lower mean test scores than our ninth and twelfth graders and 
O'Sullivan and Guilford's (1966) tenth graders on all six factor tests of 
social intelligence. Further inspection of these tables indicates that our 
ninth graders achieved lower mean scores than tenth graders of O'Sullivan and 
Guilford (1966) on all but one (X6 Social Translations) of the six factor 
tests of social intelligence. It can also be seen that our twelfth graders 
achieved higher mean scores than the tenth graders of O'Sullivan and Guilford 
.. 
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(1966) on all but one (x3 Missing Cartoons) of the six factor tests of social 
intelligence. This evident progression of mean test scores through grades 6, 
9, 10 and 12 is interpreted as supportive of the general comparability of norma 
tive data collected by the two different sources. 
A major hypothesis, concerned with the construct validity of the six 
social intelligence tests, predicted that these tests do not correlate signifi-
cantly with otis IQ as a measure of abstract or traditional intelligence. This 
hypothesis appears to be largely confirmed by the results obtained for sixth-.and 
twelfth grade groups, but not for the ninth grade group. It was necessary to 
illustrate that none of the statistically significant correlations obtained for 
grades 6 and 12 accounted for a sufficient amount of variance. 
The level of correlations between otis IQ and the six social intelligence 
tests for grades 6 and 12 in the present study.closely resembled those reported 
in similar studies. Primarily concerned with the effects of sensitivity trainiig 
on the social intelligence variable, Suran (1970), found that abstract intell~-
gence was not significantly correlated with social intelligence as measured by 
the Guilford tests (Social Translations, Cartoon Predictions, Missing Cartoons, 
and Expression Grouping). Guilford and Hoepfner (1966) reported a mean correla-
tion of .32 between IQ and various measures of creative potential. Hoepfner and 
O'Sullivan (1968) noted that IQ test scores correlated with the following facto 
tests of social intelligence to the specified degree: CBU Expressions .33; CBC 
Expression Grouping .30; CBR Silhouette Relations .17; CBS Missing Cartoons .42 
CBT Social Translations .41; CBI Cartoon Predictions .36. Thus, their correla-
tions ranged from.17 to.42, with three correlations in the 30's, two in the 40's 
and with a mean correlation of .34. The correlations reported between otis IQ 
and the six social intelligence tests for our sixth grade group ranged from 
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0.01 to .35, with a mean correlation of .23. The correlations reported for our 
twel~h grade group ranged from .d3 to .35, with a mean correlation of .22. 
Why the correlations obtained for ninth graders in our study, in such 
direct contrast to those obtained for grades 6 and 12, were highly statisti-
cally significant and accounted for a sufficient amount of variance is not 
fully clear. One possible explanation would be that the ninth graders had 
distributions of scores which were appreciably different from thos obtained 
by sixth and twelfth graders on the otis IQ test or the six social intelligence 
tests. Inspection of the data in Tables 2, 3, and 4 indicates that ninth 
graders had an appreciably greater standard deviation than sixth and twelfth 
graders on the otis IQ test as well as having a larger standard deviation on 
three of the six separate tests of social intelligence. Hence, it would 
appear that the greater variability of scores evidenced in the ninth grade 
group accoti~1ted, ~,t least in part, for the higher correlations which are 
registered for this group. The fact that the distribution of otis IQ scores 
for the ninth grade has a positive skew is evident when it is observed that the 
ninth and twelfth grade means for otis IQ are both ll2 while their standard 
deviations are 12 and 10 respectively. That the ninth grade group with its 
larger numbers of high IQ subjects should correlate most highly with various 
social intelligence measures is not surprising. It has been found, for 
ex.ample, that low IQ examinees can range from high to low on social intelli-
gence measures, while high IQ subjects tend to have high social intelligence 
scores. The fact th~t IQ has similar levels of correlation with both 
creative potential and social intelligence measures but that the 
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patterns of their relationships are very different has been demonstrated by 
Hoepfner and O'Sullivan {1968). These authors reported a triangular 
bivariate distribution between IQ and social intelligence test performance. On 
the basis of these results, Hoepfner and O'Sullivan {1968) reasoned that the 
high IQ subjects have either (1) a high level of social intelligence, evidence 
of the gifted individual's general intellectual and emotional well-being, or 
{2) utilize verbal skills to compensate and solve many of the behavioral 
problems in the social intelligence tests. However, according to the authors, 
the involvement of verbal skills was expected to be minimized in the formulatio 
I 
of the social intelligence tests. But those precautions do not necessarily 
prevent the use of highly developed and pervasive verbal skills by those who 
h~e them, a possibility which points out a potential weakness of the social 
in~elligence tests for testing verbally gifted people. Perhaps one of the 
chief values of these social intelligence tests lies in their capacity to 
identify those of moderate or low traditional or verbal IQ who are nonetheless 
gifted in social perception. 
The second major hypothesis of this study predicted female superiority in 
social intelligence test scores. Only partial support for this hypothesis 
was found and even this evidence is questionable. The analyses of variance 
for SCC I, SCC II, as well as for CBS Composite x7, and CBT Composite X3, 
{reported in Tables 14, 16, 30, and 32 respectively), did indeed show a 
significant effect for sex in favor of females. But it must be·pointed out 
that these significant sex effects were found on composite scores. In compos-· 
ite scores it is quite possible that a number of nonsignificant and sometimes 
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the false impression of significant sex effect. 
The confirmation of the female superiority hypothesis should depend more 
validly on the comparative results of males and females on the six single tests 
of social intelligence. The results of the analyses of variance conducted for 
each of the six texts of social intelligence revealed a significant effect for 
sex on only two of the six tests: X4 Missing Pictures (Table 24) and X6 Social 
Translations (Table28). Inspection of the data in Table 2 reveals that sixth 
grade females scored slightly higher than sixth grade males in five of the six 
social intelligence tests. There was, however, less than a 2 point difference 
between the male and female means in four of those five cases. Inspection 
of the data in Table 3 revealed that ninth grade females scored higher than 
ninth grade males in four of the six social intelligence tests. 
Other evidence in favor of a slight female superiority in social 
intelligence test performance can be found in Table 4 which reports that 
twel~h-grade females achieved higher group means than twelfth grade males in 
five of the six social intelligence tests. Admittedly, the difference between 
the male group mean and the female group mean was less than 1 point in each 
of the five cases. However, it should be remembered that the mean Otis IQ 
score of grade 12 males (115.08) was found to be significantly _higher than 
the mean for the females (109.10), according to the results of .. the Duncan's 
Test reported in Table 7. In other words, in the case.: of the twelfth grade 
where males who had a significantly higher mean Otis IQ score than females and 
therefore should have done better, actually attained lower mean scores than 
females on five out of six social intelligence test scores. In summary, 
inspection of Tables 2,3, and 4 for grades 6, 9, and 12 respectively, reveals 
that females did better than males in 14 out of 18 possible comparisons of 
group mean scores on social intelligence tests. 
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In addition, it can be said that females show a slight superiority to 
males in a composite score of social intelligence tests. This apparent female 
superiority is based on the fact that two of the six tests showed a significant 
effect in favor of females. Females did consistently better than males across 
three age-grade levels in these two social intelligence tests: X4 Missing 
Pictures, reportedly a primary measure of cognition of behavioral systems; and 
X6, Social Translations, reportedly a primary measure of cognition of behaviora 
t~ansformations. It is interesting to note that O'Sullivan, Guilford, and de 
Mille (1965) reported that in the original development of their tests of 
social intelligence, Social Translations was one of the five out of a total of 
47 experimental tests which showed a significant correlation (.15) with sex 
in favor of females. O'Sullivan et al. (1y65) w~~t on to note that although 
the correlations for sex membership were significant, the largest of them was 
.17 which indicated only minimal relatedness. Apparently, in the subsequent 
experimental development of the presently published battery of six social 
intelligence tests, any sex membership correlation was corrected. According 
to the manual (O'Sullivan & Guilford, 1966), none of the tests in their 
present form showed a significant correlation with sex membership. Reports of 
normative data and of the relationship between social intelligence and IQ have, 
thejefore, been presented for the sexes combined (Guilford & Hoepfner, 1966; 
Hoepfner & O'Sullivan, 1968). Results of the present research, however, in 
agreement with those of Bronfenbrenner et al. (1958) find partial support for 
a slight superiority of females in tests of behavioral intelligence. 
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The third major hypothesis predicted a significant progression in the 
development of social intelligence skills with age. Acceptance of this 
hypothesis depended upon the confirmation of two corollary hypotheses, one of 
which was not confirmed. It was predicted that age groups would not differ 
significantly on the test which allegedly measured the most basic behavioral 
cognition (Expression Grouping x2 for cognition of behavioral classes, CBC). 
This hypothesis was not confirmed; in other words, a significant effect for 
age was found where it was not expected. The second corollary hypothesis 
predicted a significant age effect on those social intelligence tests which 
allegedly measure the.more complex behavioral cognitions, namely: Cartoon 
Predictions x1 , Missing Cartoons x3, Missing Pictures X4, Picture Exchange x5, 
and Social Translations X6· A significant age effect was, as expected, found 
for each of these tests of social intelligence. 
c~mv 
Summary 
Three hundred subjects (50 males and 50 females at each of three grade 
levels: 6, 9, and 12) were given six brief social intelligence paper and 
pencil group tests developed by O'Sullivan ~nd Guilford (1966). All subjects, 
pre-tested on the Otis as a traditional measure of IQ, were randomly selected 
frOI!l class lists of t~ir respective·primary and secondary schools. Selection 
of schools (one primary school and two high schools) all three of which share 
. ' a two city block radius, represented an attempt to control those socio-
ecomonic and racial factors which might possibly affect the development of 
social intelligence. All subjects were assigned a social class rating 
according to the Coleman Index (1959), from data supplied by school records and 
by the subjects themselves on a pre-testing information sheet. Data compiled 
on each subject included: sex, age, social class rating, traditional 
intelligence: Otis IQ, and the following social intelligence test variables: 
Cartoon Predictions (X1 ), Expression Grouping Cx2 ), Missing Cartoons (x3), 
Missing Pictures (X4), Picture Exchange (X5), Social Translations (X6), Social 
Cognition Composite I (x1 and x2 and X3 and X6~and Social Cognition Composite 
II (X1 and x2 and x3 and x4 and x5 and X6). 
Descriptive statistics such as Mean and Standard Deviation were 
inspected to insure comparability of groups on such relevant variables as 
traditional IQ, socio-economic rating, and age within each of the three grade 
levels. Major hypotheses were as follows: (1) As a demonstration of the 
construct validity of the six social intelligence tests, they do not correlate 
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significantly with Otis IQ as a traditional measure of abstract intelligence • 
. 
{2) Females demonstrate a superiority over males in performance on the six 
factor tests of social intelligence. (3) A developmental hierarchy of 
social intelligence will be demonstrated as (a) on the test which measures the 
most basic behavioral cognition, age groups will not differ significantly, 
and (b) on the tests which measure the more complex behavioral cognitions, 
age groups will differ significantly. 
Partial support was found for the first two hypotheses. 
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